

THE
INDIAN HISTORICAL
QUARTERLY

Edited by
NARENDRA NATH LAW

Vol. XIV



CAXTON PUBLICATIONS

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First Published 1938

Published by :

CAXTON PUBLICATIONS
 B-3/53, Ashok Vihar, Phase-II
 Delhi-110052. India
 Phone : 7112866

Printed at

Efficient Offset Press, Dayabasti, Delhi

Vyādi and Vajapyayana

Vyādi and Vajapyayana were two grammarians older than Kātyayana, as shown by his reference to them in his *Vārttika*.¹ The former was the author of an extensive work called *Saṅgraha*, no longer extant,² which Patañjali mentions, and on which, as attested by long-established tradition, he based his 'great commentary' on Pāṇini. These two grammarians seem to have differed from each other in their views respecting certain important details. One of the differences was in regard to the import of words and is fairly well known. In fact, it is in pointing out this divergence that Kātyāyana mentions both of them. Many writers on Sanskrit grammar since have referred to this difference;³ and it has also been noticed in modern works on the subject.⁴ It is proposed here to refer to a second point of divergence between them which does not appear to be so well known now. But since it relates to the import of propositions or, more strictly, sentences, it is necessary to start by restating briefly the nature of the first difference, which concerns the meanings of words.

Students of modern Logic are familiar with the question as to whether terms are to be understood in extension or in intension. A

¹ See *Vārtikas* 35 & 45 on Pāṇini, I, ii. 64. (Keilhorn's edition of the *Mahābhāṣya*, pp. 242, 244). For some interesting remarks on the probable date of Vyādi, see Goldstücker's *Pāṇini*, pp. 209-11.

² See Puṇyarāja's com. on *Vākyapadiya*, ii. 484. From the way in which he introduces stanzas 267 & 268 of the second *kānda* of the *Vākyapadiya*, one would conclude that they are taken from this work of Vyādi.

³ Cf. Helārāja on *Vākyapadiya*, iii. 2, Puṇyarāja on *Ib.*, ii. 155 and *Sarvadarśana-saṅgraha*, ch. xiii.

⁴ For example, in the *Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus* by Dr. P. C. Chakravarti, p. 185.

controversy of a very much allied character, viz., whether words mean a *dravya* or *jāti* occupies an important place in ancient Indian works.⁵ According to Vyādi, they signify *dravyas*, while according to Vājapyāyana they, including proper names, signify *jātis*.⁶ It should, however, be carefully remembered that neither view excludes from the complete significance of words either of these two aspects of things. The question, as Patañjali points out,⁷ is only which of the two aspects should bear more emphasis and which less. Those who maintain that the meaning is *dravya* imply that it is the primary sense of the word and that *jāti* is the subsidiary. Similarly those who hold that the meaning is *jāti* imply that that is the primary sense and that *dravya* is the subsidiary. By *jāti* is to be understood an essential quality which is common to two or more things. We may take it as equivalent to what is called a 'universal' in English. Some hold that this quality is only an abstraction, others regard it as objectively real; but this is a distinction which is not of consequence for us now. According to Vājapyāyana then, a word primarily stands for an attribute or *viśeṣaṇa*. The precise conception of *dravya*, which is the import of a word according to Vyādi, is more difficult to determine. But we shall, for the moment, take it in the sense in which it is commonly taken, viz. a *vyakti* or a particular instance of a class, say, a cow called Khaṇḍa or Śābaleya. That is, a word stands for the *viśeṣya* here and not for the *viśeṣaṇa* as in the previous view.⁸

5 Cf. *Nyāya-sūtra*, II. ii. 55-66 and *Mimāṃsa-sūtra*, I. iii. 30-6.

6 According to Pāṇini, the meaning may be either the one or the other. See *Mahābhāṣya*, vol i, p. 6: *Kim punarākṛtiḥ padārthaḥ, āhosvit dravyam? Ubbaya-mityāḥ.*

7 Vol. i, p. 246: *Na hyākṛti-padārthikasya dravyam na padārthaḥ, dravya-padārthikasya vākṛtiḥ na padārthaḥ. Ubbayor ubbayam padārthaḥ. Kasyacit tu kiṁcit pradhāna-ubhūtam kiṁcit guṇa-ubhūtam. Ākṛti-padārthikasyākṛtiḥ pradhāna-bhūtā dravyam guṇa-ubhūtam; dravya-padārthikasya dravyam pradhāna-bhūta-mākṛtirguṇa-ubhūtā.* Cf. Sabara on *Mimāṃsa-sūtra*, I. iii. 33.

8 See Helāraja's com. on *Vākya-padiya*, III. ii. I.

It is natural to expect, from this divergence in their views about the meaning of words, that Vyādi and Vājapyāyana differed in their views regarding the import of sentences also; and this is what Helārāja avers in the beginning of his commentary on the third chapter of the *Vākyapadiya*.⁹ The former, he says, took *bheda* as the import, while the latter took it as *samsarga*.¹⁰ It should be observed that, as in the case of the meanings of words, neither thinker leaves out the other aspect of the import entirely in interpreting a sentence; only, in the view that holds *bheda* to be the import, *samsarga* is regarded as implicit in the sentence; and the reverse is taken to be true in the other view.¹¹ Now the use of the terms *bheda* and *samsarga* for the meaning of propositions is not at all uncommon in Indian philosophical literature. According to the interpretation ordinarily given of these terms in Advaitic works,¹² both refer to relations among the things signified by the various terms constituting a proposition; but they are applicable to different types of it. The first applies to propositions like *dāñdena gām naya*, which present to the mind a manifold of inter-related things—the things being those that are denoted by the constituent words. The second applies to co-ordinate propositions¹³ like *nīlam utpalam*

⁹ See com. on iii. 5 (Benares edition, p. 11). From the manner in which Helārāja speaks, in more than one place, of this *kānda*, it is to be regarded not as a portion of the *Vākyapadiya*, but as an Appendix to it. See pp. 54, 73, 76 of the Trivandrum edition of it.

¹⁰ We should note that this discussion has reference entirely to empirical usage. The ultimate import of a sentence according to Vaiyākaraṇas, including presumably Vyādi and Vājapyāyana, is what is called *pratibhā*. Cf. Punyarāja on *Vākyapadiya*, ii. 422 and Helārāja on iii. 5, (pp. 10-11).

¹¹ See Kaiyatā's *Pradīpa* on II. i. 1, *Vārttika* 2. (Benares edn. vol. ii, p. 13): *Tatra bhedah samsargavinābhāvitvāt anumiyamāna-samsargah sāmarthyam, samsargavā bhedavinābhāvyanumyea-bhedah.*

¹² Cf. Sureśvara's *Vārttika* on *Bṛ. Up.* p. 246, St. 902, *Naiskarmyasiddhi* iii. 26 (Bombay Sanskrit Series) and *Iṣṭa-siddhi*, p. 32 (Gackwad Oriental Series).

¹³ Cf. com. on *Naiskarmya-siddhi*, iii. 3: *Abhinna-vibhakti-nirdiṣṭa* and not *bhinnava-vibhakti-nirdiṣṭa* as in the previous case.

which present to the mind a single thing, of which the qualifying features are indicated by the constituent words. The import here is thus an identity in difference. In the former case, the words not only retain the diversity of their meaning but also point to different objects; in the latter, the words, though they do not lose that diversity, point only to one object.

Now this interpretation will hardly hold in the present case¹⁴ for, since it assumes that *bheda* and *samsarga* have reference to two distinct classes of sentences, they cannot form the basis for a difference of view between two thinkers. It is clear that, if it should constitute the basis of such a difference, each view must refer to *all* sentences or at least to *one and the same type* of them; and this is exactly what we find stated by Helārāja in the passage referred to above.¹⁵ According to him, the import of a sentence is *bheda* in Vyādi's view and *samsarga* in Vājapyāyana's view. As explained there, *bheda* should be understood as equivalent to 'exclusion' or 'dissociation' and *samsarga* to 'inclusion' or 'association'. Now in Vyādi's view, as we know, the meaning of a word is *dravya*, and its main function is to distinguish the thing it means from all similar things. Thus a 'cow' means here not so much what is characterised by 'cowness' as what is distinguished from a 'horse' (say). When words with such function combine to form a sentence, they come to signify a thing not as possessing certain attributes but rather as excluding some. In Vājapyāyana's view, on the other hand, words signify qualities; and when such words combine to form a sentence, the import becomes inclusion or a combination of the qualities which they respectively connote.

14 Attention may, in this connection, be drawn to the present writer's note on the *Naiśkarmya-siddhi*, iii. 2. (p. 255).

15 See Note 9. *Tatra Vyādi-mate bhedo vākyārthab, padavācyānām dravyānām dravyāntara-nivṛtti-tātparyena abhidheyatvāt. Jāti-vādino Vājapyāyanasya tu mate samsargo vākyārthab, sāmānyānām samslesa-mātra-rūpatvāt vākyārthasya.*

We get a clearer explanation of the same in Pārthaśārathi Miśra's commentary on the last section of the *Sloka-vārttika*,¹⁶ which treats of the import of sentences. In discussing this topic, Kumārila introduces the terms *bheda* and *samsarga* as representing two of the views held in regard to it; and Pārthaśārathi's explanation there may be translated as follows: '(In the sentence *gauḥ śuklabḥ*), according to those who hold that a word points to the universal, the first word connotes 'cowness' merely; and the second, which is syntactically related to it, signifies its association with the quality of 'whiteness'. Hence the import of the sentence is (stated to be) 'inclusion'. And as that (i.e. *samsarga*) is one, the words constitute a syntactical unity. According to those, on the other hand, who hold that a word points to the particular, since the first word itself denotes cows of all colours, viz. white, black and so forth, there will be tautology if the second word, although it does not cease to indicate the connection (of the cow) with 'whiteness',¹⁷ is understood as intended to signify it. It should accordingly be explained as negatively qualifying the cow in question or as denying all other colours of it. Hence, alternatively, the import of the sentence is (stated to be)) 'exclusion'.¹⁸' One of the points to be noted here

¹⁶ See p. 854 (Benares edition). Kumārila refers to them here for the purpose of refutation.

¹⁷ So the aspect of 'inclusion' is not left out. Analogously we may say, as indeed Pārthaśārathi himself adds immediately after the passage translated above, that in the first view, 'exclusion' is implicit, the reason being that a sentence (e.g. *Gauḥ śuklabḥ āniyatām*), when taken in its practical context, must necessarily refer to an individual as in the second view. See Note 11.

¹⁸ Patañjali also explains these two terms under II. i. 1 (p. 364); but, since he is there considering the meaning of compound words and derivatives and not of sentences the explanation is not directly useful for us here. But the principle underlying it is the same. The example *gauḥ śuklabḥ* selected by Pārthaśārathi to illustrate both the views may suggest that they apply only to co-ordinate or appositional propositions; but the one, chosen by Patañjali, viz. *rāja-puruṣaḥ* shows that it need not be so.

specially is the meaning of *dravya*. We tentatively took it as equivalent to a particular instance of a class. From the above explanation, it is clear that it stands really for a class; only it means not all cows but *any* cow. In the above sentence, the first word denotes the whole class of cows; and the second, the whole class of white things. But when the two are taken as syntactically one they, by mutual restriction, signify neither any cow nor any thing that is white, but any white cow. These explanations of *bheda* and *samsarga* correspond to what in modern Logic are described as the class and the attributive views.

It will be seen that these meanings of *bheda* and *samsarga*, especially of the former, are entirely different from those assigned to them above on the authority of certain Advaitic works. It is difficult to say how the same words came to be interpreted thus differently. We know that there were several views held by Indian thinkers in regard to the import of propositions, as in the case of so many other problems; and the interpretation in question probably goes back to a view different from those alluded to by the Vaiyākaraṇas and the Mīmāṃsakas.

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